Rethinking retirement: ambition in term-limited legislatures, Journal of Legislative Studies
ABSTRACT
Political careerism has long focused on the idea of progressive ambition, rarely using retirements as a measure. The end of a legislator's career can reveal how term limits have changed the institution and legislative behaviour. Term limits, intended to curb legislative careers, have unintentionally led to changes in career ambition. The rate at which members retire is dependent on the type of term limit that a member faces and the institutional incentives to continue service. This comparative analysis uses retirement rates as a proxy for static, career-oriented ambition and reveals that there is a decreased probability of term-limited legislators retiring. The decreasing retirement rate indicates a lesser-known pathway for static ambition. Although ambition is typically viewed as those who move upward, it is also about those who rethink retirement and choose to continue serving.
ABSTRACT
Political careerism has long focused on the idea of progressive ambition, rarely using retirements as a measure. The end of a legislator's career can reveal how term limits have changed the institution and legislative behaviour. Term limits, intended to curb legislative careers, have unintentionally led to changes in career ambition. The rate at which members retire is dependent on the type of term limit that a member faces and the institutional incentives to continue service. This comparative analysis uses retirement rates as a proxy for static, career-oriented ambition and reveals that there is a decreased probability of term-limited legislators retiring. The decreasing retirement rate indicates a lesser-known pathway for static ambition. Although ambition is typically viewed as those who move upward, it is also about those who rethink retirement and choose to continue serving.
The Development of Representation in American Political Institutions, Legislative Studies Quarterly
(With Aric Dale Gooch)
ABSTRACT
At the forefront of American democracy lies the representative. There has been ample debate over congressional representation and how members of Congress are to act in response to their constituents. We take on the task of assessing the path to congressional representation by analyzing eight institutional dimensions of representation during the founding. We uncover why term limits, recall, annual terms, small constituencies, and the right of instruction were rejected under the Constitution after they had been so highly regarded a short time earlier. The Federalists sought to promote their view of good representation through institutional design, rejecting prior views of representation used in state governments. Instead, the Constitution was designed to encourage representatives to serve according to their own judgment as trustees. This analysis contributes to our understanding of how institutions were created to shape representation and provides insight into the development of the electoral connection.
(With Aric Dale Gooch)
ABSTRACT
At the forefront of American democracy lies the representative. There has been ample debate over congressional representation and how members of Congress are to act in response to their constituents. We take on the task of assessing the path to congressional representation by analyzing eight institutional dimensions of representation during the founding. We uncover why term limits, recall, annual terms, small constituencies, and the right of instruction were rejected under the Constitution after they had been so highly regarded a short time earlier. The Federalists sought to promote their view of good representation through institutional design, rejecting prior views of representation used in state governments. Instead, the Constitution was designed to encourage representatives to serve according to their own judgment as trustees. This analysis contributes to our understanding of how institutions were created to shape representation and provides insight into the development of the electoral connection.