Chutes and Ladders: How Political Ambition Plays Out in Term-Limited Legislatures
Term limits, instituted in the 1990s and early 2000s, were originally intended to curb political ambition in the American states. Since their implementation, however, scholarly research on term limits has declined. What research exists treats term-limited states as a homogeneous group, whose effects on political ambition are unclear. Using an original dataset, we analyze career ambition in term-limited state legislatures and find unique ambition patterns exclusive to states with term limits. We introduce a typology tracing ambition patterns to show that, across states with term limits, the type of limit, in conjunction with other institutional factors, shapes ambition. Our findings illustrate that term limits differ from each other, affecting political careers by redirecting ambition.
Term limits, instituted in the 1990s and early 2000s, were originally intended to curb political ambition in the American states. Since their implementation, however, scholarly research on term limits has declined. What research exists treats term-limited states as a homogeneous group, whose effects on political ambition are unclear. Using an original dataset, we analyze career ambition in term-limited state legislatures and find unique ambition patterns exclusive to states with term limits. We introduce a typology tracing ambition patterns to show that, across states with term limits, the type of limit, in conjunction with other institutional factors, shapes ambition. Our findings illustrate that term limits differ from each other, affecting political careers by redirecting ambition.
